We develop a model of a Parole Board contemplating whether to grant parole release to a prisoner who has Önished serving their minimum sentence. The model implies a simple outcome test for racial prejudice which is based on the released inmateís rate of recidivism and is robust to the inframarginality problem. Our model has several testable implications which we show empirical support for. Applying our test to data on all prison releases in Pennsylvania between 1999-2003 we Önd no evidence of racial prejudice.
Introduction
characteristics that are observable to and used by the Parole Board in their release decision, but that are unobserved by researchers. These disparities can also arise from statistical discrimination, which occurs when there is crucial information that is unobservable to the Parole Board, but that is correlated with inmate race. To deal with these issues we use an outcome-based test because, if applied properly, these tests can identify racial prejudice even in the presence of omitted variables and statistical discrimination, as racial prejudice will have a di §erent impact on the outcome in question.
The speciÖc outcome test we use is based on a simple model of the Parole Boardís release decisions. 5 We consider a Parole Board who is contemplating whether to grant parole release to a prisoner who has just Önished serving their minimum sentence and is thus eligible for parole. The Parole Board faces a trade-o §. On one hand, releasing the prisoner on parole saves the imprisonment cost; on the other hand, it imposes a social cost if the prisoner has not been rehabilitated and commits crimes upon release. We show the Parole Board will choose to grant the prisoner parole if and only if their perceived rate of recidivism is at or below a certain threshold, where the rate is deÖned as the product of the perceived probability the inmate is not rehabilitated and the rate of recidivism for non-rehabilitated inmates. 6 The Parole Board will use a lower threshold for minorities if they are prejudiced against minorities. If the inmateís rate of recidivism at the completion of their minimum sentence is too high, the Parole Board will keep the inmate incarcerated; each successive time period the inmate completes with good behavior increases the Parole Boardís perception the inmate is rehabilitated, and thus lowers their perceived rate of recidivism. The moment the inmateís perceived recidivism rate is lowered enough to hit the Parole Boardís threshold, the inmate will be released. If the inmateís perceived rate never falls enough to hit the threshold, they will be released only upon the completion of their maximum sentence. Importantly, this implies that every prisoner granted parole release between their minimum and maximum sentences has an assessed recidivism rate exactly equal to the aforementioned race-speciÖc threshold.
To implement our outcome test for racial prejudice we need to identify the release thresholds being used for each race and compare them. As is well-known, the main di¢culty that arises when implementing outcome tests is the ìinfra-marginality problemî, which refers to the di §erence between the comparisons of the average and marginal outcomes across racial or gender groups. 7 In order to identify the threshold being used, we need to identify the recidivism rate for the marginal person that is released (i.e. the person released whose rate is exactly at the threshold). Generally, though, without having access to all of the information the Parole Board has, the marginal person cannot be identiÖed. This typically results in only the average recidivism rate being identiÖed. We deal with the infra-marginality problem in this paper by noting that in our model, every prisoner released by the Parole Board between their minimum and maximum sentence, regardless of their characteristics, will have a recidivism rate exactly equal to the threshold set by the Parole Board. Therefore, within this subsample, the marginal prisoner released is the same as the average prisoner released and thus our application of the outcome test is not subject to the 5 Our model is related to Bernhardt, Mongrain and Roberts (2010) , although the goal of their paper is to show the e¢ciency of the parole board release system, instead of testing for prejudice. 6 We assume rehabilitated inmates do not recidivate.
infra-marginality critique. 8 Although this parole release setting is optimal for dealing with the infra-marginality problem, the downside of using this setting is that the outcome measure we use is not completely objective, as whether an individual is convicted of a new crime depends on the behavior of other agents that might harbor prejudice. While this potential downstream racial prejudice should not impact our ability to uncover racial prejudice on the part of the Parole Board, as we will discuss, it can end up in a situation where the Parole Board statistically discriminates simply because of downstream racial bias.
Our test for racial prejudice is based on our model of Parole Board behavior. As such, evidence for or against racial prejudice using our test is only as credible as our proposed model. Fortunately, our model has three auxiliary implications that can be tested using our data set. We Önd supportive evidence for all three of these predictions. Applying our test to the data we Önd no evidence that racial prejudice plays a role in Pennsylvaniaís Parole Board release process.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the related literature and discuss how our test Öts in with previous approaches. Section 3 describes the sentencing and parole system in Pennsylvania in detail. In Section 4 we present a model of how the Parole Board makes parole release decisions and, based on the implications of the model, derive an estimation equation that will inform us about whether racial prejudice plays a role in the Parole Boardís decision making. Section 5 describes our data set and presents the descriptive statistics, while Section 6 presents our main empirical results regarding the role of prejudice in Parole Board decisions, as well as additional evidence supportive of the auxiliary predictions of the model. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Research that speciÖcally examines racial prejudice in the parole release process has been rather scarce. The majority of the previous literature falls into two main categories, both of which we refer to as actionbased tests (since they are based on the actions of the Parole Board). The Örst type of study essentially examines whether minorities serve a greater proportion of their sentence before being paroled than their white counterparts ( Morgan and Smith, 2008) . The Öndings have been mixed. Petersilia (1983) found that minorities in Texas served a higher proportion of their sentences relative to whites, but the reverse was true in Michigan. More recently, Huebner and Bynum (2006) found that race had no e §ect on sentence served among a sample of men incarcerated for sexual o §enses.
The second strand of literature uses data from parole decisions and explicitly examines whether race has an e §ect on parole being granted. Carroll and Mondrick (1976) examined the cases of 243 prisoners who appeared before a Parole Board between 1970-1971 and Önd that race had no impact on the decision to grant parole. In a more recent study, Morgan and Smith (2008) again found that race had no e §ect on parole release decisions using a sample of 762 inmates in Alabama that were eligible for parole between 1993-1994.
While none of the studies cited above can control for the personal interactions between the Parole Board 8 Similar ideas to deal with the inframarginality problem in the outcome test for racial prejudice were also used by Ayres and Waldfogel (1994) and Anwar and Fang (2012) .
and the individual, the majority do control for other key factors the Parole Board takes into account when they make their release decisions. These include severity and type of o §ense, length of sentence, institutional misconduct and program participation, and various indices of the likely risk of recidivism upon release. As such, these studies do a good job of determining whether minority and white individuals that are similar on paper are treated the same in the parole release process. There are, however, a few downsides to the action-based tests that are implemented in the above studies. First, to the extent that the Parole Board gleans relevant information at the parole hearing which varies systematically by inmate race, the results from these studies can su §er from an omitted variables bias. Second, these studies require an extensive set of controls that are often di¢cult for researchers to obtain; this is reáected in the limited amount of previous work in this area and the relatively small sample sizes that were used. Finally, while these tests pick up all forms of discriminatory behavior if Öne enough controls are used, they do not allow us to determine which speciÖc form of discrimination (i.e. racial prejudice or statistical discrimination) is causing the disparity. While both types of discrimination are illegal, to eliminate disparities it is useful to know why they arise in the Örst place.
The outcome test we develop in this paper is in response to the shortcomings of these action-based tests. SpeciÖcally, as will be detailed in Section 4, our test will only require us to observe limited information about individuals that is readily available in most data sets kept by a stateís Department of Corrections. As such, it is an easier test to implement. Further, ours is a test speciÖcally designed to pick up racial prejudice and can thus help reveal why racial di §erences are occurring. Note, however, that because our test is for racial prejudice it makes no statement as to whether statistical discrimination is occurring. In this sense, one can think of outcome-based and action-based tests as complimentary.
Our paper is most closely related to a recent paper by Mechoulan and Sahuguet (2015) which also uses an outcome test to test for racial prejudice in parole release decisions. 9 Our paper di §ers from Mechoulan and Sahuguet in both modeling and data, which leads to us running di §erent empirical tests. Both papers, however, Önd no evidence of racial prejudice against blacks in the parole release process. In Appendix A we detail the speciÖc di §erences between the approaches and show empirical evidence that, in our data set, only our model is supported.
Criminal Sentencing and Parole Release in Pennsylvania

10
All individuals in Pennsylvania convicted of a crime are sentenced by a judge who determines their minimum and maximum sentence. 11 O §enders with a maximum sentence of less than two years are sent to jail. For o §enders that have a maximum sentence between two to Öve years, the sentencing judge 9 Our paper and Mechoulan and Sahuguet (2015) were developed simultaneously. 10 Unless noted  otherwise,  the  information  regarding  the  parole  release  process  described  in  this  section  comes  from  the  website  of  Pennsylvaniaís  Board  of  Probation  and  Parole: http://www.pbpp.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/reports_and_publications/5358/publications/617822 11 The judge is aided in their decision by the sentencing guidelines, which consist of a grid containing a range of suggested minimum sentences, where the o §enderís o §ense gravity score of their current o §ense is on one axis, and their prior record score (measuring their prior criminal activity) is on the other axis. Judges are not required to conform to these guidelines.
has discretion over whether to send them to jail versus prison. 12 O §enders with a maximum sentence greater than Öve years are automatically sent to prison. Individuals sent to prison must serve at least their minimum sentence. Once they have completed this, Pennsylvaniaís Parole Board, which consists of nine members appointed by the governor, has complete discretion over when to release them, up until they reach their maximum sentence. 13 Approximately four months before the inmate completes their minimum sentence, board members and hearing examiners will review the inmateís Öle. The board uses this information to Öll out the Parole Decisional Instrument form, which serves as a guideline for release. The instrument takes into account the type of conviction o §ense (non-violent or violent), the level of risk (low, medium, or high) of returning to prison for a new o §ense or violation according to the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), 14 institutional programming completion, and institutional behavior. The inmate receives scores for each of these four critical dimensions, which are summed up to calculate an overall score. 15 Scores from 2 to 6 ìsuggest paroleî, while scores of 7 or greater ìsuggest parole refusalî.
The board is not bound by these guidelines when casting their vote, however, and can take into account other factors such as the recommendation of the sentencing judge, prosecuting attorney, and warden, as well as their general impression of the inmate during the parole interview. The decision makers for each case depend on the type of o §ense committed. For non-violent o §enses, a hearing examiner and one board member will vote on the case. For violent o §enses (except sex crimes and murder), two board members will vote on the case. The inmate must receive two a¢rmative votes to be granted parole. For murder and sex o §enses, the full board reviews the case, and the majority of the board must approve the inmateís release. Approximately 70% of the Önal case decisions follow what the Parole Decisional Instrument recommends.
Individuals that are not granted parole are given a list of speciÖc requirements to be fulÖlled by the time of the next parole review, which is usually within six months to a year. Individuals that are granted parole are released and monitored by parole o¢cers. They can be returned to prison if they have a technical violation of their parole requirements, or if they commit a new crime. 16 
A Model of the Parole Boardís Behavior
In this section we propose a simple continuous-time learning model of the Parole Board which is adapted from the model developed in Bernhardt, Mongrain and Roberts (2010) . We derive several implications and use these to test whether the Parole Board exhibits racial prejudice in their release decisions. 12 The sentencing judge has discretion over when individuals sent to jail are released. 13 Once this is reached, they ìmax outî and must be released. 14 The LSI-R is a quantitative survey of o §ender attributes and their situation, and is designed to help predict recidivism. 15 For example, an o §ender receives three points for serving a sentence for a violent o §ense, receives three points if they have an unacceptable program compliance, receives three points if the LSI-R considers them high risk, and receives Öve points if they have a record of serious misconduct in prison (Goldkamp, 2010) . 16 Common reasons for technical parole violations include failure to report to a parole o¢cer, carrying weapons, travelling too far from home, not maintaining employment, and failing drug and alcohol tests (Petersilia, 2003) . Parolees receive an average of Öve violations before being returned to prison.
The Model
We model the Parole Boardís behavior from the Örst moment inmate i becomes eligible for parole release, which occurs after they have served their minimum sentence T i : At that time the Parole Board observes a set of information which it uses in its parole release decision. Some of the information is available to researchers, while some of it will not be. For example, information regarding the inmateís conviction (type of crime committed and the sentencing terms), and their basic demographics (gender, race and age) are observed in our data set; however, we do not observe any information that is likely contained in an inmateís prison dossier, including the behavior and incidents of the inmate while in prison and their general demeanor. We denote the information available to the Parole Board about inmate i at time
where r stands for the race of the inmate and c T i for all other information. For simplicity, we assume that the race of a prisoner is either white, denoted by W; or minority, denoted by M ; i.e., r 2 fW; M g :
Rehabilitated or Non-rehabilitated. We assume that once the inmate completes their minimum sentence they are either ìrehabilitatedî or ìnon-rehabilitatedî, and that their type does not change from that point on. In our model, there are two major di §erences between a rehabilitated and a non-rehabilitated inmate. First, a rehabilitated inmate will not recidivate, while a race-r non-rehabilitated inmate will recidivate at Poisson arrival rate g r > 0 if parole released. 17 Second, when imprisoned, a race-r non-rehabilitated inmate will be involved in prison incidents at a Poisson arrival rate + r > 0; however, rehabilitated inmates will not be involved in prison incidents. Prison incidents can be thought of as any event in prison that will negatively a §ect the probability of parole, such as misconduct with other prisoners or guards, or not completing required programming. Note that we allow both the recidivism rate for non-rehabilitated parolees and the incident arrival rate for non-rehabilitated inmates to depend on their races. The former is especially important as minorities and whites are likely to be parole released into very di §erent environments, which can have an e §ect on their future criminal behavior.
Parole Boardís Payo §s, Belief Evolutions, and Release Decisions. At any time after inmate i has served their minimum sentence T i and before their maximum sentence # T i ; the Parole Board needs to decide whether to keep the inmate imprisoned or grant parole release. Suppose that the cost of holding a prisoner for a particular time period is B; regardless of the race of the prisoner and whether they are rehabilitated. 18 The cost of releasing a non-rehabilitated inmate of race-r for a particular time period is g r C, where g r is the rate at which a non-rehabilitated race-r inmate will recidivate during that time period, and C is the cost to the Parole Board that results from the inmate recidivating.
The Parole Board can also obtain a psychological beneÖt D r % 0 from keeping a race-r prisoner imprisoned. If the Parole Board is prejudiced against a particular race of inmates they are likely to feel a higher psychological beneÖt from keeping them imprisoned. 19 This idea is summarized in the following deÖnition: 17 In Section 4.4.1 we discuss how recidivism will be measured. 18 In the empirical section this time period corresponds to one month. 19 If the Parole Board is prejudiced against minority inmates, we are essentially saying DW = 0 and DM > 0, so that the cost of imprisoning minorities for an extra period is less than compared to whites due to this extra psychological beneÖt. This is similar to the racial proÖling literature, whereby prejudiced police o¢cers enjoy searching minorities more, and thus the cost to search them is less (see Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) and Anwar and Fang (2006) ).
Nonrehabilitated Rehabilitated
In The costs associated with releasing a race-r prisoner for a particular time period is summarized in Table 1 . We assume that 0 < B & D r < g r C: These parameter restrictions imply that, if the Parole Board knows for certain that a prisoner is rehabilitated, it prefers that the inmate be released; on the other hand, if the Parole Board knows for certain that an inmate is non-rehabilitated, it prefers that the inmate be imprisoned.
Because a parolee will return to prison if they recidivate, the Parole Boardís decision of whether to release a prisoner on parole is simply to compare the cost of keeping them incarcerated for the next period with the cost of releasing them for the next period. 20 For the purpose of this comparison, let us denote by 0 i t the Parole Boardís belief at time t that inmate i is of a rehabilitated type for some t % T i . (We will describe the evolution of the Parole Boardís beliefs next.) The Board will release the prisoner on parole if and only if the cost of releasing them is lower than the cost of keeping them incarcerated at time t:
Thus, the Parole Board will grant parole release to inmate i only if it is su¢ciently conÖdent that i has been rehabilitated. Importantly, the threshold 0 $ r deÖned in (1) is increasing in D r : This means that if the Parole Board is prejudiced against race-r inmates, they need to be more certain (probabilistically) that race-r inmates are rehabilitated before granting parole release. Intuitively, if the Parole Board is prejudiced against race-r inmates, then the the cost of incarcerating race-r inmates is lower, and consequently at the indi §erence point the cost of releasing them must also be lower. We summarize the above discussion by the following proposition: Proposition 1. The Parole Board will grant parole release to a race-r inmate at the Örst point in time between T i and T i when its belief about the inmate being rehabilitated exceeds 0 $ r .
The Parole Board cannot perfectly know whether the prisoner is rehabilitated or not at the time of the parole decision. Instead it forms beliefs based on available information, beginning at the time period when prisoner i has just completed their minimum sentence T i . We denote 0 i T * 0 Figure 1 shows the 20 If the parolee does not recidivate at time t they will remain on parole for time t 0 = t + $, where $ > 0 is small. When we discuss the evolution of the Parole Boardís beliefs in the next section it will be evident that if it is proÖtable for the board to release the inmate at time t and the inmate does not recidivate at time t, it will be even more proÖtable for the board to release the inmate at time t 0 . Thus when deciding to release an inmate, comparing the costs and beneÖts at time t is all that matters. relationship between the evolution of the Parole Boardís beliefs and their release decisions for eight racer inmates who have no incidents while in prison, but enter the prison with di §erent characteristics. 21 The vertical axis measures the evolution over time of the Parole Boardís beliefs that these prisoners are rehabilitated. In particular, for prisoners 1-3, upon completion of their minimum sentence T ; the Parole Boardís belief that they are rehabilitated, 0 i T ; already exceeds the threshold 0 $ r , and thus the Parole Board will release them immediately.
For prisoners 4-8, however, 0 i T < 0 $ r ; and thus these inmates will not be released immediately at T i :
Their speciÖc time of release will then depend on the evolution of the Parole Boardís belief of 0 i : Recall that the Parole Board will use all available information about prisoner i at time t to form their belief 0 i t . Although most of this information is static (such as prisonersí demographics and crime committed), the one component that will change over time is whether or not they are involved in prison incidents. We now derive the di §erential equation that governs how 0 i t changes over time. Consider a small interval of time & between t and t+&: Because we assume that prison incidents arrive according to a Poisson process, we know that when & is small, there are two possible outcomes between t and t + & : the Örst outcome is that an incident occurs in this time interval and the second outcome is that no incident occurs. If an incident occurs, then the belief of the Parole Board will immediately decrease to 0 and remain there up through T , because only non-rehabilitated inmates will be involved in an incident. If no incident occurs, then the Parole Board will update its beliefs using Bayesí rule. Noting that a race-r 21 To keep the Ögure simple all eight prisoners have the exact same sentence, but this assumption has no impact on the results presented in this section. nonrehabilitated inmate will have no incidents during time interval & with probability e %%r i ! , we have:
Thus, the evolution of the Parole Boardís posterior belief if no incidents have occurred through t + & is governed by the following di §erential equation:
Note that _ 0 i t > 0, which means each time period in which prisoner i doesnít have an incident increases the Parole Boardís probability assessment that prisoner i is rehabilitated. This corresponds to the evolution of beliefs for prisoners 4-8 being drawn as upward sloping.
If inmate i has not been involved in any incident from T up through time t; then we solve the di §erential equation (2) to Önd an expression for 0 i t :
Proposition 2. (Parole Boardís Belief Evolution) If the Parole Boardís initial belief that inmate i is of rehabilitated type is 0 i T ; and the inmate is not involved in any incident from time T to time t; then the Parole Boardís posterior belief at t is given by (3).
As stated in Proposition 1, the Parole Board will want to release prisoner i the moment 0 i t hits 0 $ r . We can Önd this optimal release time, denoted t $ i , by equating 0 i t with 0 $ r and solving out for t:
If this point in time occurs after the prisonerís maximum sentence T , the Parole Board will be constrained to release them upon completion of T . This is the case for prisoners 7 and 8 in Figure 1 . If this point in time occurs between the prisonerís minimum and maximum sentences, as is the case for prisoners 4-6, the Parole Board will release them exactly at
The following proposition summarizes the Parole Boardís release decisions: Proposition 3. (Characterization of the Release Time) Let the Parole Boardís initial belief about race-r inmate i being of rehabilitated type be 0 i T . Assuming inmate i has no incidents in prison after T , the Parole Boardís release schedule is as follows:
An important implication of the model is that all race-r prisoners released between T and T will have a probability of being rehabilitated that is exactly 0 $ r . As is evident from Figure 1 this is not the case for those released at either T and T : Among race-r prisoners released at the completion of their minimum sentence, there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in their probability of being rehabilitated at the time of their release. The same is true among race-r prisoners released at their maximum sentence.
For simplicity we have assumed that rehabilitated inmates do not commit prison incidents. However in Appendix B we show that all of the key model implications continue to hold even if we allow rehabilitated inmates to be involved in prison incidents, as long as they commit these at a rate lower than their nonrehabilitated counterparts.
Reasons for Racial Di §erences in Sentence Served
The framework of the model also allows us to see the various reasons inmates of di §erent races serve di §erent proportions of their sentences. The Örst case we consider is a racially prejudiced Parole Board. For ease of exposition, assume for now that + and g are the same across races. As discussed earlier, if the Parole Board is racially prejudiced against minority inmates they will require them to have a higher probability of being rehabilitated than white inmates (i.e.
shows the e §ects of this on two inmates, one white and one minority, who have exactly the same characteristics (and are thus represented by the same 0 i t curve). As is evident from the Ögure, t $ W < t $ M , and thus the minority inmate will be forced to serve more of their sentence than the identical white inmate.
Disparities in time served can also arise from statistical discrimination, which occurs when there is crucial information that is unobservable to the Parole Board, and is correlated with inmate race. It will be e¢cient for the Parole Board to proxy for this unobservable information by taking an inmateís race into account. If, on average, minorities are known to rate worse with respect to this unobservable information, statistical discrimination will result in the Parole Board having a lower initial probability of a minority inmate being rehabilitated than they will have of an observationally equivalent white inmate. As shown in Figure 2 (b), the Parole Board will then require more incident-free time of minorities before they hit the release threshold.
If the parameters + and g di §er across races, it will be e¢cient for the Parole Board to take these di §erences into account, which will again lead to observationally equivalent individuals serving di §erent amounts of their sentences. Because the Parole Board uses this information out of e¢ciency purposes (and not racial prejudice), this is another manifestation of statistical discrimination.
Finally, an omitted variables problem will also result in us observing racial di §erences in time served. This is di §erent than both racial prejudice and statistical discrimination, because in both of the above cases, researchers have access to the same information the Parole Board does, but will still Önd racial di §erences in time served using a regression framework. With an omitted variables problem, we can Önd racial di §erences in time served simply because we cannot control for all of the factors the Parole Board takes into account in making release decisions.
The above analysis makes clear that a valid test for racial prejudice cannot rely on time served, because racial prejudice, statistical discrimination, and an omitted variables problem all have similar implications on time served. In the next section we will develop a test that does not have this problem.
Test for Racial Prejudice
Given the di¢culty mentioned above in using the racial disparities of the parole release time as indications of racial prejudice, we instead use an outcome test. This test requires an outcome that can be identiÖed with available data, and where taste and statistical discrimination have di §erent impacts. If we restrict ourselves to looking at inmates that are released between their minimum and maximum sentences, the outcome that satisÖes both of these requirements is the inmateís expected rate of recidivism on parole, deÖned as (1 & 0 $ r ) g r . Recall that this rate is the same for everyone within a race because the Parole Board strategically releases every race-r inmate at the time their probability of being rehabilitated is exactly 0 $ r . Plugging in the expression of 0 $ r from (1), we have
Thus, the only reason the expected rate of recidivism will di §er across races occurs if D di §ers across races, which happens if racial prejudice is present. Intuitively, with statistical discrimination, the Parole Board will take race into account when making release decisions, but they do so in such a way that the expected rate of recidivism across all races is the same. When the Parole Board is racially prejudiced against race-r inmates, they will require them to serve longer than is optimal and they will thus recidivate at a lower expected rate. Note that the probability that parolees are rehabilitated, 0 $ r ; would not satisfy the outcome test requirement because both racial prejudice and statistical discrimination can lead to 0 $ r di §ering by race. From Equation 5 we see the optimal 0 $ r depends not just on prejudice but on g r as well. SpeciÖcally, even if there is no racial prejudice, race-r members would be required to have a higher probability of being rehabilitated if their non-rehabilitated members have a higher rate of recidivating upon release. While the fact that our test relies on comparing recidivism rates as opposed to rehabilitation rates is a direct implication of the model, this result is in line with the likely incentives of the Parole Board. From the Parole Boardís perspective, two individuals who are released with the same rehabilitation probability but di §erent rates g r will impact them in di §erent ways. Even though both individuals will have the same eventual likelihood of recidivating, the individual with the higher g r (and thus the higher recidivism rate) will likely recidivate much sooner. While the recidivism cost of both individuals is the same, the Parole Board is harmed much more by the individual that recidivates right away because they essentially get no beneÖt from releasing them as they only avoid the cost of incarcerating them for a short time period. Thus a Parole Board that is not racially prejudiced will work to ensure that all released individuals recidivate at the same rate, because this measure takes into account not just if an individual will recidivate but when.
We cannot explicitly identify the recidivism rate in our data because this would require averaging the number of crimes an individual commits in a given release period across all members of the race. In our data we only observe whether an individual was sent back to prison for committing at least one crime, but do not observe how many total crimes they committed during that period. We can, however, indirectly estimate the rate of recidivism by exploiting the fact that this rate will positively a §ect the probability an individual will recidivate at least once within a given release period. SpeciÖcally, because only nonrehabilitated types will recidivate, and they will do so at Poisson arrival rate g r i > 0, the probability that inmate i will recidivate at least once within a given amount of time t i , is:
where we refer to t i as inmate iís exposure time. Figure 3 graphs this expression for members of a given race who have varying exposure times t i . The probability an individual recidivates at least once within their exposure time is positively related to their exposure time and asymptotically approaches the proportion of race-r individuals that are not rehabilitated. Because an individual is expected to commit a certain number of crimes in a given period (deÖned by their rate), the longer we observe them the more likely it is they have committed at least one crime. Once we observe these individuals for a long enough time frame we would expect all non-rehabilitated individuals to have recidivated at least once; rehabilitated individuals will never recidivate, and thus the curve approaches
. Taking a second order Taylor series approximation of the above curve explicitly shows how the recidivism rate of race-r members a §ects the shape of the curve:
where the last equality follows from plugging in the expression of 0 $ r from (1). Note that the coe¢cient on exposure time t i , which measures the slope of the curve at the origin, exactly corresponds to the recidivism rate of race-r members that we are trying to identify. Intuitively it makes sense that the recidivism rate deÖnes the slope at the origin, as this slope closely corresponds to the proportion of people expected to have recidivated at least once at the end of the Örst release period. All else equal, if a race of individuals is released at a higher recidivism rate, either because their members are rehabilitated at a lower rate or because their members have a higher recidivism rate conditional on being non-rehabilitated, one would expect them to have a higher fraction of individuals that recidivate right away. 22 We can thus estimate the recidivism rate of each race by estimating (8) in a standard regression framework. SpeciÖcally, to estimate the rate for each race separately, we run the following regression:
where Recidivate i is an indicator for whether the parolee recidivates within their exposure time, and Minority i is an indicator for whether inmate i is a minority. 23 The coe¢cient 3 1 is our estimate of the expected recidivism rate for whites, while (3 1 + 4 1 ) is the expected recidivism rate for minorities. Recall that if the Parole Board is racially prejudiced against minorities it will result in minority inmates having a lower expected recidivism rate. Thus, our test for racial prejudice will be whether 4 1 < 0: Note that our test does not require us to have any observable information about the inmate except their race, their exposure time, and whether they recidivated during this exposure time. 22 Note that although at the origin the only thing that a §ects the curve shape is the product of the two components of the recidivism rate
and gr i , as we move further away from the origin, the individual components of the rate will have distinct impacts on the shape of the curve. SpeciÖcally, at higher exposure times the race that has the higher non-rehabilitated rate will have a curve that lies above that of the race with a lower non-rehabilitated rate. Thus, because our test involves comparing the overall recidivism rate, we focus on the slope near the origin. 23 In the estimation section we will estimate this separately for blacks and Hispanics. In estimating (9) we are essentially estimating a curve similar to that shown in Figure 3 for each race. We thus need to have members of a given race spread out among di §erent exposure times. To do this, we deÖne exposure time as the number of months from an individualís release date from prison until January 1, 2004. As will be discussed in Section 5 our data includes all individuals released from prison between 1999-2003. This results in the individuals in our sample having exposure times which vary from one day to Öve years. 24 It is important to note that the only reason we can use (9) to estimate the recidivism rate for race-r inmates is because all inmates of race r are released with the same 0 r . This ensures that the coe¢cient on t i is race-speciÖc, and thus can be estimated. If instead individuals within a race were released at di §erent 0ís the coe¢cient would be individual-speciÖc and could not be estimated. This issue is more generally known as the infra-marginality problem and is a common problem for outcome tests. We avoid this problem because in our context the Parole Board can perfectly adjust the treatment variable (time served) to ensure that everyone has the same rate. This point highlights why our test is not valid for those who are released at their minimum or maximum sentence, since those inmates are released with various rates of rehabilitation.
Our solution to the infra-marginality problem also highlights that the core assumption we make that must be satisÖed is that the Parole Board is able to release individuals at exactly t $ i . This assumption is consistent with the way the parole process works. If individuals are turned down for parole upon completion of their minimum sentence, they are given a list of things to do and the time when they will next come up for parole. This time window is variable from inmate to inmate, and is at the complete discretion of the Parole Board. We can think of the time window the Parole Board sets for inmate i as the extra incident-free time that is needed for their perception that inmate i is rehabilitated to hit the race-speciÖc threshold 0 $ r . Thus, for all intents and purposes, the Parole Board is able to release every inmate at the optimum time. 25 
Testable Implications of the Model
Because our test for prejudice comes directly from our model, it is important to run some validity checks. In this section, we delineate three implications of the model that can be directly tested. These tests will be carried out empirically in Section 6.1. 24 Note that even if there are systematic di §erences between individuals with di §erent exposure times (resulting from them being released at di §erent times), the Parole Board can still ensure that everyone within a race is released with the same rate of recidivism. For example, suppose the environment these individuals are released in changes over time which would a §ect the rate gr at which non-rehabilitated inmates recidivate at. Our model predicts that the Board will respond by changing the probability threshold %r at which these race-r members need to be rehabilitated at so that the resulting recidivism rate they are released at will remain unchanged (and independent of exposure time). 25 If individuals are turned down for parole at their next opportunity, it is usually because they have had some type of misconduct during that time window, and/or they did not complete their required programming (i.e. they have had prison incidents). With our current model, this implies that these individuals would be considered non-rehabilitated and would never be released. However, in Appendix B we expand our model to show that we can easily allow rehabilitated individuals to have some incidents while in prison, and thus it is possible for these individuals to eventually be released on parole. Figure 3 separately for each race. This equation implies that the probability a race-r inmate recidivates within their exposure time is positively related to the length of their exposure time, and is negatively related to the square of their exposure time. The intuition behind the positive coe¢cient on exposure time was explained in the previous section. The intuition behind the negative coe¢cient on t 2 i is as follows: at an exposure time of zero, the full (1 & 0 $ r ) fraction of race-r individuals are eligible to recidivate. As exposure time increases and more of these individuals have recidivated, there is an increasingly smaller stock of individuals that can transition to the state of recidivating at least once. Thus we would expect the probability of recidivating at least once to increase but at a decreasing rate. Note that this equation only applies to individuals released between T and T , and thus we restrict the analysis to these individuals when we carry out the test. Figure 1 which implies that, within a race, all individuals released between T and T will recidivate at exactly the same rate. As Figure 1 shows, this implies that their recidivism rate will be independent of the fraction of the assigned sentence they serve.
The Örst testable implication is based o § (8), which is estimating the curve shown in
The second testable implication is based o §
3. The third testable implication is based o § the probability a race-r inmate released between T and T recidivates within a certain time window P :
This expression is similar to (6) , except now the time window over which we examine the recidivism probability is the same for everyone and is not inmate speciÖc. Recall that any race-r inmate released exactly at T should have a rehabilitation probability 0 i that is at or above 0 $ r . This means the average probability of recidivating within P among all race-r inmates released at T should be lower than the average among race-r inmates released between T and T (which is given by (10)). Likewise, among race-r inmates released at T , 0 i ( 0 $ r , implying their average probability of recidivating within P should be greater than for the group released between T and T . Thus we should Önd that the probability of recidivating within P should be in ascending order for those released immediately after serving their minimum sentences, those released in-between their minimum and maximum sentences, and those released after serving their maximum sentences.
Notes About the Model 4.4.1 Objectivity of the Outcome Measure
One of the key requirements of using an outcome test is that the outcome itself must be objectively measured. 26 Our outcome is based on recidivism which we measure in the two ways most commonly used in the literature: (1) a return to prison for the commission of a new crime; and (2) a return to prison either because the individual was convicted of a new crime or a technical parole violation. For the outcome to be truly objective we would need all individuals who either committed a new crime or technical parole violation to have the same probability of being returned to prison regardless of race. The fact that there is a decent literature showing racial disparities at various stages of the criminal justice process (referenced in the introduction) suggests this may not be true. This section discusses the potential implications of having a non-objective outcome measure.
Since our test is designed to pick up racial prejudice on the part of the Parole Board the biggest potential hindrance to the validity of the test would be if the Parole Board itself could a §ect the outcome. They would then be able to cover up racial prejudice at the parole release stage with further prejudice at the outcome stage. Fortunately, the Parole Board does not have much impact on either of the recidivism measures used. The Parole Board has no direct involvement in whether an inmate is returned to prison for a new crime; the Parole Board has some input on whether an inmate will be returned to prison for a technical parole violation, but ultimately it is up to an independent hearing examiner to decide.
The recidivism measures we use can, however, be impacted by any racial prejudice on the part of other downstream agents such as police o¢cers, prosecutors, judges, and parole agents. This downstream prejudice would result in minorities having a higher g r not because their non-rehabilitated members were more likely to commit crimes, but simply because (conditional on committing a crime) they were more likely to be convicted. Recall that a non-prejudiced Parole Board will respond to di §erences in g r across races by requiring minorities to serve more time so that they have a higher probability of being rehabilitated before release. This means minorities might be serving more time simply due to downstream racial prejudice, which goes beyond the traditional deÖnition of statistical discrimination. While our test will still correctly conclude that there is no racial prejudice on the part of the Parole Board, it has no power to pick up the latter sub-optimal result.
Crime Controls
Up until now we have assumed that the cost to the Parole Board that results from an individual recidivating, denoted as C, is the same across all prisoners. However, the cost to the Parole Board is likely to be a §ected by the type of o §ender the individual is. SpeciÖcally, the Parole Board is likely to view recidivism by a violent o §ender as more costly than recidivism by a drug o §ender. From Equation (1) one can see that if the cost to the Parole Board from the individual recidivating is higher, they will respond by making these types of o §enders have a higher probability of being rehabilitated, resulting in a lower expected rate of recidivism. Because o §ender type is strongly related to race, it is important to control for this when estimating (9) . We break crimes out into three groups: (1) murder or sex crimes; (2) violent crimes outside of murder or sex crimes; and (3) non-violent crimes such as drug or property crimes. As noted in Section 3, the Parole Board has more stringent release procedures for the release of the Örst two groups of o §enders, which implies there is a higher cost when these groups recidivate. Note that in order to allow di §erent types of o §enders to have di §erent recidivism rates we need to estimate the curve shown in Figure 3 separately for these groups. This requires us to interact indicators for crime group with both exposure time and the square of exposure time.
Data
We use data from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections on all individuals who were released from prison between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003. The data includes individuals who were released before the completion of their maximum sentence and were thus on parole from their release date until their maximum sentence expired; it also includes individuals who were released at the completion of their maximum sentence and thus spent no time on parole. We restrict the data set to individuals who were new court admissions when they Örst entered our data set and who were either white, black, or Hispanic males. We are left with a total of 26,343 individuals.
For each of the above individuals we observe their sentence lengths (minimum and maximum) prescribed by the judge, admission date, release date, the dates their minimum and maximum sentences are completed, name, state identiÖcation number, date of birth, and main o §ense committed. 27 We also observe each prisonerís subsequent returns to prison before March 31, 2009 (if any). We have information on the date of this return, as well as the reason for the return: whether it was for a new crime committed or a technical parole violation. 28; 29 We use this information to code the two key dependent variables in the regression form of our test for racial prejudice speciÖed in (9): whether an individual returns to prison due to the commission of a new crime within their exposure time, and whether an individual returns to prison due to the commission of a new crime or a technical parole violation within their exposure time. SpeciÖcally, for each of the individuals released between their minimum and maximum sentence, we calculate their exposure time as the number of months between their date of release and January 1, 2004. 30 We then code an indicator variable for whether an individual has recidivated within this exposure time by examining whether their return to prison is before January 1, 2004. 31 [ Table 2 About Here] 27 The date the minimum sentence is completed is often di §erent than just the sum of the prison admission date and the minimum assigned sentence. Many individuals that cannot a §ord bail (or are deemed too risky) spend time in jail while they are awaiting formal sentencing, and get credit for this time served once the formal sentence is handed down. Having the date the minimum sentence is completed allows us to accurately identify individuals that are released right after serving their minimum sentence (by comparing the prison release date with the minimum sentence completion date). It also allows us to accurately calculate time served as the minimum assigned sentence plus the di §erence between the prison release date and the minimum sentence completion date. 28 Note that our data only picks up whether an o §ender commits a new crime if it results in them going back to prison. This should not pose too big of a problem as individuals will be on parole for the majority of the time that we need to observe their recidivism behavior; while on parole any new conviction should automatically send the o §ender back to prison. 29 We do not observe the speciÖc reason for the technical parole violation, nor do we observe if they committed multiple violations. 30 Note that we choose January 1, 2004 as our cuto § (even though we observe recidivism behavior up through early 2009) because when estimating Figure 3 it is important that we have some individuals with exposure times that are very short (i.e., close to the origin). Since our sample includes people released from 1999-2003, this will give us individuals with exposure times that are reasonably spread out from one day to Öve years. If we had instead used early 2009 as the cuto § we would not have any individuals with exposure times close to the origin. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of our sample both overall and stratiÖed by race. 36% of our sample is white, 52% is black, and 13% is Hispanic. The majority of individuals released are age 45 or under. We broke the inmateís current crime into Öve categories: murder/sex, other violent, property, drug, and other. The type of crime individuals commit varies signiÖcantly by race: while 14% of whites commit a murder or sex crime, only 8% of blacks and 7% of Hispanics do. On the other hand, drug crimes are primarily committed by minorities. The sentence length variable shows the minimum and maximum sentences handed down by the sentencing judge. On average, individuals are given a sentence with a minimum of 34 months and a maximum of 83 months; they typically serve 48 months of their assigned sentence. Blacks tend to be assigned and serve longer sentences than both whites and Hispanics.
The release group variables indicate that 31% of the sample were released upon completion of their minimum sentence, 49% were released at some point between their minimum and maximum sentence, and 20% were not released until the completion of their maximum sentence. Here we Önd that whites are actually more likely than blacks or Hispanics to be required to serve their full sentence.
Finally, the last panel of Table 2 shows the mean levels of the two recidivism measures we will use to run our test in the next section; for these estimates we only include the individuals that are released between their minimum and maximum sentence. We Önd that about 12% of individuals return to prison at least once within their exposure time due to committing a new crime. The proportion increases to about 38% when we also include technical parole violations.
6 Empirical Analysis
Testing Model Implications
This section presents the results of the three model tests that were outlined in Section 4.3. These model checks should all hold within a race and so we run the tests separately by race; we also show the results for all races pooled together for completeness. (8) by regressing whether an individual recidivates at least once within their exposure time on ìExposure timeî and ìExposure Time 2 î (without a constant). As noted in Section 4.3 the coe¢cients on the variables should be positive and negative, respectively, when the sample is restricted to those individuals who are released between their minimum and maximum sentence. Table 3 shows the results of these regressions for both recidivism measures. All the coe¢cients have the predicted sign and all except one are statistically signiÖcant.
The Örst test estimates equation
[ Table 3 About Here]
2. The second test checks whether the amount of an assigned sentence an o §ender serves is unrelated to their recidivism rate. As Figure 1 indicates, all individuals within a race released between their minimum and maximum sentence should recidivate at exactly the same rate regardless of sentence.
To determine this we regress whether an individual recidivates at least once within their exposure time on ìExposure timeî and ìExposure Time 2 î, as well as these two variables interacted with the following: actual sentence length, the assigned minimum and maximum sentence length, and indicators for whether the crime an individual committed was a murder/sex crime, or another violent crime. 32 This speciÖcation will essentially estimate a curve similar to that in Figure 3 for everyone who commits the same type of crime and has the same assigned sentence. 33 The coe¢cient on the interaction between exposure time and sentence length will then reveal whether the recidivism rate (and thus the resulting curve) depends on the actual sentence served. Table 4 shows the results of these regressions; for brevity we only show the key coe¢cients. In all but one instance the coe¢cient on ìExposure Time * Sentence Lengthî is statistically insigniÖcant, implying the fraction of sentence served is unrelated to an individualís recidivism rate.
[ Table 4 About Here]
3. The third test compares the probability of recidivating at least once within a given time period for individuals released at di §erent points of their assigned sentence. As discussed in Section 4.3 we would expect this probability to be the lowest for individuals released right upon the completion of their minimum sentence, and the highest for individuals not released until their maximum sentence is completed. The recidivism probability for individuals released between their minimum and maximum sentence should be between these two extremes. Table 5 presents the results from regressing the likelihood of recidivating within a certain time period on indicators for when the individual was released, as well as crime controls (whose coe¢cients are not shown for brevity reasons). For robustness, we use two di §erent time frames for each of our recidivism measuresñnamely, columns (1) and (3) correspond to whether an individual recidivates within three years upon release, and columns (2) and (4) correspond to whether an individual recidivates within Öve years upon release. Note that columns (3) and (4) correspond to whether an individual returns to prison within the speciÖed time frame for either a new crime or technical parole violation. Because individuals released upon the completion of their maximum sentence mechanically cannot return to prison for a technical parole violation (since they are not released on parole) we drop these individuals and only compare recidivism probabilities among the other two groups. The constant coe¢cient shows the corresponding recidivism probability for those individuals released between their minimum and maximum sentence. We would expect the coe¢cients on the indicator for being released at the minimum sentence to be negative, and the indicator for being released at the maximum to be positive (when used). This is precisely what we Önd, although not all coe¢cients are statistically signiÖcant.
[ Table 5 About Here]
Main Result: Test for Racial Prejudice
In this section we implement the test implied by the model to determine whether there is evidence that racial prejudice plays any role in the Parole Boardís discretionary parole release decisions. SpeciÖcally, the 32 Note that crime controls are necessary here because sentence length will likely be correlated with crime type. The more severe the crime, the lower the recidivism rate an individual will be released at; on average, the Parole Board will have to keep these more severe o §enders incarcerated longer to hit the lower rate. It is still the case, however, that within a crime type sentence length should have no e §ect on the recidivism rate 33 Note that in order to do this any control variable must be fully interacted with both exposure time and exposure time 2 .
regression results reported in Table 6 correspond to the test outlined in (9), and is run using only inmates that are released between their minimum and maximum sentences. The coe¢cient on ìExposure Timeî corresponds to the recidivism rate for whites (i.e., the expected number of times a white individual would be expected to recidivate within one month). The coe¢cients on ìExposure Time * Blackî and ìExposure Time * Hispanicî reveal whether blacks and Hispanics, respectively, recidivate at a di §erent rate than whites. Regardless of the recidivism measure used, these coe¢cients are always small and statistically insigniÖcant, implying that all racial groups are released at the same recidivism rate threshold and thus we conclude the Parole Board is not racially prejudiced in its parole release decisions.
[ Table 6 About Here]
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of a Parole Board contemplating whether to grant parole to a prisoner who has Önished serving their minimum sentence. In our model the Parole Board chooses to grant the prisoner parole if and only if the assessed recidivism rate is at or below a threshold, with the threshold being lower for minority prisoners if the Parole Board is prejudiced against minorities. We show that when inmates complete incident-free time periods in prison, the Parole Board responds by revising downward their perception of the inmateís rate of recidivism upon release. Because the Parole Board has complete discretion over when to release prisoners within the constraints of their minimum and maximum sentence this results in all prisoners released between these bounds being released at exactly the point where their rate of recidivism hits the optimum race-speciÖc threshold.
Our model implies we can identify the race-speciÖc thresholds used by simply identifying the racespeciÖc average rate of recidivism for those individuals released between their minimum and maximum sentences. This approach is immune to the infra-marginality problem because, within these bounds, the marginal prisoner released is exactly the same as the average prisoner released. Using data on all prisoners released in Pennsylvania from 1999 to 2003 we Önd no evidence of racial prejudice on the part of the Parole Board.
Finally, it is important to point out that while our test shows no evidence of racial prejudice it does not necessarily mean parole release decisions do not reáect discrimination. As mentioned previously, the Parole Board can also engage in statistical discrimination, a practice which is illegal but one which our test does not pick up. This highlights the use of tests that are action-based as a complement to our outcome-based approach, since the former will pick up whether observationally equivalent minority and white inmates are treated di §erently for any reason. Because our test implies racial prejudice is not a problem, any di §erence picked up is likely due to statistical discrimination. We do not run these tests here as we do not have the requisite controls to rule out omitted variables bias. However, obtaining a detailed record of the information available to the Pennsylvania Parole Board that would enable these action-based tests to be run is an important area of future research, especially since Pennsylvania has a large prison population and parole release continues to be the sole way prisoners can obtain an early release.
Appendix
A Comparison with Mechoulan and Sahuguet (2015) In Section 2 we mentioned the study done by Mechoulan and Sahuguet (2015, henceforth, MS) is the only prior work that uses an outcome test to study prejudice in the Parole Board release process. While their paper comes to a similar conclusion as ours ñ namely, there is no evidence of racial prejudice against blacks in the parole release process ñ these papers run reasonably di §erent tests for discrimination on di §erent data sets. 34 This appendix details both the theoretical and empirical di §erences between these papers. The key di §erence between our paper and the MS paper is that we model the incentives of the Parole Board di §erently and thus end up running a di §erent test for racial prejudice. In the MS model the Parole Board aims to minimize the total number of individuals that recidivate while on parole and thus, in the absence of prejudice, all prisoners are released such that their probability of recidivating while on parole is the same. The Parole Board can accomplish this because of the mechanical relationship between recidivating on parole and time on paroleñthe less time an individual spends on parole, the lower the probability they will recidivate on parole. Thus when we look among the individuals that are released they will have di §erent recidivism rates; however those with high recidivism rates will only be released when they have a short amount of time left on parole so that the overall likelihood of recidivating on parole is equalized across all inmates. In contrast, in our model the Parole Board compares the beneÖts and costs of keeping an inmate for the next period, which results in the Parole Board releasing all inmates with the same rate of recidivism in the absence of prejudice. Realistically, the core di §erence between the models is that MS assumes the Parole Board views recidivism at any time during parole to bear the same net cost; in contrast, our model assumes the Parole Board Önds recidivism that comes closer to the release time to have a higher net cost than recidivism long after release. This results in MS comparing probabilities of whether individuals ever recidivate, while we compare rates which incorporate not just if an individual recidivates, but when.
The papers also di §er in the data used. We use a detailed data set that is speciÖc to prison releases in Pennsylvania. MS use data from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) which is less detailed but covers many di §erent states; they do not report results from Pennsylvania in their study.
In order to assess the practical di §erences between these tests it is useful to run both tests on the same data. Table A1 presents the results from running the MS test on our data. SpeciÖcally, we regress the probability an inmate recidivates while on parole on an indicator for whether the inmate is black or Hispanic. 35 The MS paper uses two di §erent deÖnitions of recidivism: whether an inmate returns to prison due to the commission of a new crime (shown in Columns 1 and 2), and whether the inmate returns to prison for any reason (shown in Columns 5 and 6). While we use the Örst measure as well, we do not Önd the latter measure to be a good deÖnition of recidivism. Our data reveals that approximately 14% of these returns include individuals who are charged with either committing a technical parole violation or a new crime, but where the charges were later dropped and they were subsequently released. It thus does not seem accurate to code these individuals as recidivating. 36 To see how robust the results are to the recidivism deÖnition used, we include in Columns 3 and 4 our other deÖnition of recidivism, which is returning to prison for either a new crime or technical parole violation. Like ours, the MS test is designed to be run on only the individuals the Parole Board releases between their minimum and maximum sentence. However the NCRP data includes all individuals released on parole and does not identify which individuals were released exactly at their minimum sentence and which individuals were released between their minimum and maximum; MS thus 34 MS do not include Hispanics in their sample. 35 We drop individuals where we do not observe the full time period they are on parole. 36 There are huge racial di §erences in who is a §ected by these mistaken returns: 16% of the returns by blacks fall into this category in contrast to only 9% of the white returns.
must include both groups of individuals in their sample. To mirror this sample speciÖcation Columns 1, 3 and 5 run the analysis on all individuals released on parole; Columns 2, 4 and 6 restrict the sample to those the test was designed to be run on.
The results imply that regardless of the sample speciÖcation or recidivism measure used, the black coe¢cient is always positive and statistically signiÖcant. This is the same result MS Önd in their paper. It is reassuring that these di §erent approaches both reach the same conclusion that there is no racial bias against blacks in the parole release process.
37
[ Table A1 About Here]
As a Önal exercise we test whether the data is more consistent with the predictions of our model or the MS model. SpeciÖcally, one key testable implication where our models di §er is the e §ect of parole time on the probability of recidivism on parole. We detail in Section 4.3 that our model predicts that if we observe an individual for a longer period of time, we are more likely to observe them recidivating. Applied to the MS setting, this would mean that the longer an individual is on parole, the more likely they are to recidivate while on parole. The MS model, however, says that all individuals should have the same probability of recidivating on parole, and thus time on parole should have a zero e §ect on recidivism probability. In fact, in the MS model this is the strategic variable the Parole Board uses to ensure recidivism probabilities are equalñinmates that have a higher recidivism rate will be released with less time on parole so that they will (mechanically) have a lower chance of recidivating while on parole. Table A2  reruns the speciÖcations from Table A1 , except also adds in a control for months on parole to explicitly determine the relationship between parole time and the probability of recidivating on parole. Regardless of the speciÖcation used, the coe¢cient on parole time is always positive and strongly statistically signiÖcant which supports our model.
[ Table A2 About Here]
B Robustness of the Model to Prison Incidents for Rehabilitated Prisoners
In the basic model we assumed that only nonrehabilitated inmates would be involved in prison incidents. Now suppose that rehabilitated prisoners can also be involved in such incidents, but at a lower rate than non-rehabilitated types. SpeciÖcally, suppose that race-r inmates are involved in prison incidents with Poisson arrival rate + 1r if they are non-rehabilitated, and + 0r they are rehabilitated with + 1r > + 0r % 0: This section shows that all of the key implications of the model will still hold.
Similarly to the derivation of the belief evolution equation (2), we can show that, if there is no occurrence of incident at time t; then the Parole Boardís belief that i is rehabilitated evolves according to:
Note that (B1) coincides with (2) when + 0ri = 0: On the other hand, if an incident occurs at time t; the Parole Boardís revision of its belief about the inmate will not jump down to zero as in the basic case where + 0r = 0: However, the posterior will still exhibit a discrete downward jump whose magnitude is derived as follows. Consider a short time interval between t and t + &: If an 37 Although technically the MS model would interpret this positive coe¢cient as the parole release process favoring blacks, they realistically suggest that this result is likely to be reáecting a tradeo § the Parole Board has between equalizing recidivism outcomes and equalizing timing of release. Therefore, in this extended environment where rehabilitated inmates may also be involved in prison incidents, the Parole Boardís evolution of beliefs becomes more complicated as it goes up continuously with episodes of no incidents, but exhibits a discrete downward jump following any incident. The more complicated belief evolution makes it impossible to provide an analytical expression of the release time t . The e §ect of this generalization on Figure 1 is that the time paths for the belief evolutions will stochastically exhibit discrete downward jumps. However, the key feature for our test ñ that prisoners who are released in between their minimum and maximum sentences are all released at the rehabilitation belief threshold 0 # r ñ remains valid. 
